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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, among other 
things, discrimination on the basis of national origin.1  Over the past 
several decades, numerous individuals have challenged English-only 
language policies by claiming that they are discriminatory and have a 
disparate impact on certain national origin groups.2  These individu-
als argue that English-only policies create a hostile work environment, 
which constitutes discrimination with respect to conditions of em-
ployment.3  Since the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC)4 guidelines on national origin discrimination state that the 
mere existence of an English-only policy is sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination,5 bilingual employees rely on these 
guidelines to establish a claim of disparate impact discrimination.6
Under the guidelines, the employees do not have to prove that the 
policy has any substantial adverse impact in order to shift the burden 
to the employer; they simply must show that the employer has an Eng-
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2008) (“It shall 
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”). 
2 See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006) (dis-
cussing the legality of Oklahoma City’s English-only policy for employees), abrogated on 
other grounds by Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Garcia v. 
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing a California meat-
distribution company’s English-only policy); cf. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1606–1606.1 (2008) (defining national origin 
discrimination as “the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individ-
ual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an individual has the physi-
cal, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group”). 
3 See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1303 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged that the Eng-
lish-only policy created a work environment “that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))). 
4 The EEOC is the government agency with enforcement authority over Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as all of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, certain sections of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990.  See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Laws En-
forced by the EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/laws.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
5 See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)–(b) (2008) (declaring that those English-only policies 
that apply at all times, including on breaks, should be automatically subjected to strict 
scrutiny, whereas policies that only apply to part of the work day should still place the 
burden on the employer to show a business-necessity justification). 
6 See, e.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305; EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. 
Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
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lish-only policy in place to establish the adverse impact.  Courts,  
however, have been divided on whether to grant deference to these 
guidelines.7
Although national origin claims are not as common as those made 
under many other Title VII protected class categories,8 they are likely 
to become increasingly important.  Immigration is an extremely sali-
ent political topic,9 and as the number of bilingual employees in the 
7 Compare Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (rejecting explicitly the EEOC guidelines), 
with Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305-06 (affording the guidelines some respect, as a form 
of guidance), and EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (giving the guidelines “great deference”). 
8 From 1997 through 2007, national origin discrimination charges increased from 
being alleged in 8.3% of all EEOC filings to 11.4% of filings.  During this same period, 
charges of race and sex discrimination have each been present in over 30% of EEOC 
charges, and allegations of age and disability discrimination have each been alleged in 
approximately 20% of filings.  EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2007 
(2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2009).  Importantly, the EEOC calculates the percentage of charges in which a claim of 
each type is alleged, rather than the percentage of total claims that each type com-
prises.  Because many charges contain multiple claims, the percentages calculated by 
the EEOC can add up to well over 100%.  In 1997, for example, there were 80,680 
charges brought, though there were 131,967 total claims.  Id.  The percentages applied 
in this Comment are those used by the EEOC, meaning that 5.1% of the charges 
brought in 1997 contained at least one allegation of discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin. 
9 The immigration issue was repeatedly front-page news in the New York Times over 
the late spring and early summer of 2007.  See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Kennedy Plea Was Last 
Gasp for Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A1; Robert Pear & Michael Luo, 
Critics in Senate Vowing to Alter Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at A1; Robert 
Pear & Jim Rutenberg, Senators in Bipartisan Deal On Broad Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2007, at A1.  In addition, among Republican voters, the issue consistently 
polled as an important issue in the early parts of the 2008 primary elections.  See Elec-
tion Center 2008:  Primary Exit Polls, CNN, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/epolls/index.html#NHREP (showing that immi-
gration was a close third in the list of most important issues to Republican primary vot-
ers in New Hampshire); Election Center 2008:  Primary Exit Polls, CNN, Jan. 3, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/epolls/#val=IAREP (not-
ing that the top concern of 33% of Republican caucus-goers in Iowa was immigration). 
Although the economy dominated the general election (with 57% of potential voters 
deeming it the most important election issue), 5% of likely voters still considered ille-
gal immigration to be the most important issue when deciding how to vote.  Election 
Center 2008:  Election Tracker:  Candidate Polling, CNN, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.cnn. 
com/ELECTION/2008/map/polling.  Further, one poll in late October 2008 found 
that 26% of U.S. voters were “angry about the current immigration situation,” and 74% 
thought that the government was “not doing enough to secure the nation’s borders.”  
26% Angry About Immigration, The Issue Candidates Ignore, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, Oct. 
23, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/ 
immigration/26_angry_about_immigration_the_issue_candidates_ignore.  Given that 
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country continues to expand, the legality of English-only policies will 
continue to gain importance.10  In addition, committees in both the 
Senate and the House are considering amendments to Title VII, in-
cluding proposals specifically targeted to “[p]rovide relief for workers, 
regardless of immigration status, who are victims of labor and em-
ployment law violations.”11  Such bills would only further increase the 
reach of Title VII to bilingual employees and reaffirm the topic’s 
growing importance.  In light of the disagreement between circuit 
courts in their national-origin-discrimination jurisprudence and the 
likelihood of a continued increase in such complaints, it is time for 
the Supreme Court to determine both the scope of national origin 
discrimination under Title VII as well as the level of deference that is 
due to the EEOC guidelines on the subject. 
This Comment focuses specifically on the application of the 
EEOC guidelines to bilingual employees, as it is in these cases that 
plaintiffs rely most heavily on the guidelines to demonstrate an ad-
verse impact.  Part I examines the jurisprudence of national origin dis-
crimination against bilingual speakers.  Part II then addresses the level 
of deference due the EEOC guidelines under standard administrative 
law.  Finally, Part III analyzes the advantages of following the EEOC 
guidelines from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint, and it 
compares the treatment of national origin discrimination claims to 
those of race and sex discrimination. The EEOC guidelines represent 
a thoughtful and well-reasoned approach to national origin discrimi-
nation and should receive the standard deference granted to interpre-
tative rules issued by administrative agencies. 
the immigration issue was not resolved, Congress will almost inevitably revisit the topic 
in the coming years. 
10 See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 13-I, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/national-origin.html (citing the statistic that 38% of new jobs were filled by im-
migrants between 1990 and 1998 and declaring that “[a]s the composition of the 
American workforce continues to change, Title VII’s prohibition against national ori-
gin discrimination has become increasingly significant in ensuring equality in em-
ployment opportunities”).  In addition, there is evidence that English-only policies 
themselves are becoming more important, as the number of policy-related suits filed 
increased from 30 in 1996 to over 120 in 2006.  Tresa Baldas, English-Only Workplace 
Policies Trigger Lawsuits, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1182194749541. 
11 Press Release, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Cardin and Mikulski Co-Sponsor 
Civil Rights Act of 2008 ( Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author); see also S. 2554, 110th Cong. 
(2008); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. (2008) (stating that the purpose of the bill itself was “[t]o 
restore, reaffirm, and reconcile legal rights and remedies under civil rights statutes”). 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH-ONLY JURISPRUDENCE:
FROM GLOOR  TO MALDONADO
Workplace discrimination under Title VII can take two forms:  
disparate treatment or disparate impact.12  Disparate treatment is gen-
erally thought of as the more standard, straightforward type of dis-
crimination; a showing of disparate treatment requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that there has been unequal treatment (uneven pay or 
different conditions of employment, for example) that is based on 
protected-class status (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).13
In disparate treatment cases, it is necessary to prove that the employer 
acted with a discriminatory animus.14
Most cases that challenge English-only language policies, however, 
are disparate impact cases.  To establish a prima facie case, the plain-
tiff must show that a seemingly neutral policy or practice has a signifi-
cant adverse impact on a protected class of employees.15  If the plain-
tiff makes that showing, the burden is shifted to the employer to 
demonstrate a business necessity for the alleged practice.16  Impor-
tantly, under the disparate impact theory it is not necessary to prove 
that the employer intended the discriminatory impact.17
The major federal circuit court cases dealing with English-only 
policies—and the district courts’ application of these decisions—were 
decided over a period of several decades, and they are interspersed 
with the issuance of the EEOC guidelines and congressional amend-
ments to Title VII.  Overall, courts range in their treatment of the 
guidelines from those that have held that the guidelines deserve no 
deference18 to those that have held that they must receive “great def-
12 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484 (“Thus, a plaintiff alleging discrimination under 
Title VII may proceed under two theories of liability:  disparate treatment or disparate 
impact.”). 
13 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (listing the 
four elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of a failure-to-
hire claim under Title VII). 
14 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484 (requiring discriminatory intent in disparate 
treatment cases). 
15 Id. at 1486. 
16 Id.
17 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988) (stating that 
“some facially neutral employment practices may violate Title VII even in the absence 
of a demonstrated discriminatory intent”). 
18 See, e.g., Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(“[T]he EEOC Guidelines must be disregarded.”). 
1518 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1513
erence.”19  A brief chronological summary of the evolution of the Eng-
lish-only jurisprudence is helpful in shedding light on the issues that 
courts face today. 
A. Gloor and the EEOC Guidelines 
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit became the first federal appellate court 
to address the issue of English-only policies and national origin dis-
crimination, and it did so in the context of a disparate treatment 
claim.20  In Garcia v. Gloor, the court addressed whether national ori-
gin discrimination was broad enough to encompass language dis-
crimination such as English-only policies in the workplace.21  Garcia, 
who was fluent in both English and Spanish, worked at Gloor Lumber 
and Supply, Inc., in Texas.22  As an employee, he was subject to a rule 
against speaking Spanish unless with a Spanish-speaking customer.23
When asked a question by a fellow employee, Garcia responded in 
Spanish in the presence of a company officer, and was subsequently 
discharged.24  Garcia claimed that his language was a defining charac-
teristic of his national origin, so that being denied the right to speak 
in his preferred language qualified as discrimination on the basis of 
his national origin.25
The Fifth Circuit rejected Garcia’s argument, asserting that 
“[n]either the statute nor common understanding equates national 
origin with the language that one chooses to speak.  Language may be 
used as a covert basis for national origin discrimination, but the Eng-
lish-only rule was not applied to Garcia by Gloor either to this end or 
with this result.”26  While the Gloor court did leave open the possibility 
that language could be used as a proxy for national origin, and there-
fore that policies dealing with language could violate Title VII, it did 
19 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
20 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). 
21 Id. at 268. 
22 Id. at 266. 
23 See id. (detailing the English-only rule and noting that it did not apply to those 
who worked in the lumber yard or to any employee during his or her break). 
24 See id. at 266-67 (noting that although Garcia was discharged following this par-
ticular incident, the employer alleged other violations of this and other policies to jus-
tify the firing). 
25 See id. at 267 (“An expert witness called by the plaintiff testified that the Spanish 
language is the most important aspect of ethnic identification for Mexican-Americans, 
and it is to them what skin color is to others.”). 
26 Id. at 268. 
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not believe that any such policy automatically had the adverse impact 
required to establish a national origin discrimination claim.27  Since 
Garcia had not shown that the language policy was intended to elimi-
nate members of a certain national origin from the workplace, he did 
not establish the discriminatory animus necessary to maintain his dis-
parate treatment claim.28
The EEOC responded to Gloor by issuing guidelines on the topic 
of national origin discrimination on December 29, 1980.29  Although 
not complying exactly with the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
EEOC generally followed formal notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures in adopting these guidelines, receiving over 250 public 
comments.30  Two sections of the guidelines in particular are notewor-
thy.  First, in section 1606.1, the EEOC stated that “[t]he Commission 
defines national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not 
limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an 
individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an 
individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a na-
tional origin group.”31  This section directly responded to the decision 
in Gloor and makes clear that “national origin discrimination” covers 
discrimination on the basis of language.  The second important sec-
tion is 1606.7, which specifically addresses “Speak-English-Only” rules.  
Under this provision, if the rule only applies to part of the sphere of 
employment, the presence of the language policy will shift the burden 
and require the employer to show a business necessity for the policy.32
If, however, the rule applies at all times, including on breaks, courts 
should presume that the policy is burdensome and scrutinize it closely.33
When these sections are read together, they set forth a much 
more stringent standard for language policies and national origin dis-
crimination than did the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gloor.  Under the 
EEOC guidelines, any employer who wants to implement a language 
policy could be required to provide a business justification for doing 
27 Id. at 270. 
28 Id. at 272. 
29 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (2008). 
30 See Michael Patterson, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Company: English-Only Rules 
in the Workplace, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 287 (1995) (“The Commission carefully solicited 
comments from federal entities and the public at large to assure that the process in-
cluded ‘interested persons’ in ‘all stages of [the] rulemaking process.’” (alteration in 
original) (internal citations omitted)). 
31 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (emphasis added). 
32 Id. § 1606.7(b). 
33 Id. § 1606.7(a). 
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so, even without the plaintiff’s proving that the language was being 
used as a proxy for national origin (for a disparate treatment case) or 
that the specific policy at issue has a significant adverse impact on the 
group (for a disparate impact case). 
B.  The 1991 Amendments and Garcia v. Spun Steak
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to address several cases that 
had been decided by the Supreme Court following the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.34  Most notably, these amendments required that the em-
ployer bear the burden of proving that the alleged discriminatory 
conduct was justified by a business necessity, and they created a provi-
sion for monetary damages in sexual harassment cases.35  Although 
discussed during the Senate hearings, the amendments did not alter 
the portions of the Civil Rights Act that specifically address national 
origin discrimination.36
Following these amendments, the Ninth Circuit became the sec-
ond federal appellate court to address the issue of English-only poli-
cies in the workplace, but the first to do so since the EEOC had issued 
its guidelines.37  The plaintiffs in Garcia v. Spun Steak were bilingual 
employees who worked in a meat-packaging factory.38  After English-
speaking employees complained that they were being harassed in 
Spanish by their co-workers, the company instituted an English-only 
policy for all work-related activities.39  Following the implementation 
34 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 23-32 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549 
(declaring that one of the main functions of the amendments was to overturn Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)); see also Steinle v. Boeing Co., 785 F. 
Supp. 1434, 1436 n.3 (D. Kan. 1992) (stating that the purpose of the 1991 amend-
ments was to overturn various provisions of the following:  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
(1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 
642; and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).  The provisions that were 
overturned generally involved issues of when damages were recoverable and what bur-
dens would be borne by which party throughout the litigation. 
35 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II). 
36 The fact that these sections were discussed during debate has an important bear-
ing on the level of deference due the EEOC guidelines.  See infra subsection II.B.2. 
37 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). 
38 Id. at 1483. 
39 See id. (“[I]t is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be 
spoken in connection with work.  During lunch, breaks, and employees’ own time, 
they are obviously free to speak Spanish if they wish.  However, we urge all of you not 
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of the policy, the plaintiffs sued, alleging that the English-only policy 
violated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on Spanish-
speaking employees.40
The Ninth Circuit held that adopting an English-only language 
policy was neither violative of Title VII as a matter of law,41 nor on the 
facts pled in the specific case.42  Of more interest, however, was the 
court’s refusal to shift the burden to the employer and require it to 
show a business necessity for the policy upon a demonstration that an 
English-only rule was in place.43  In leaving this burden with the plain-
tiffs, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to follow the EEOC guide-
lines.44  The court, however, went further than merely refusing to ap-
ply the guidelines; it claimed that there was a “compelling indication” 
that the EEOC’s interpretation was wrong and contrary to the plain 
language of the statute.45
Since the court did not apply the EEOC guidelines, it was re-
quired to determine if the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial 
adverse impact.  The court concluded that they had not, since the 
plaintiffs were bilingual and could have chosen to speak English.46
Without a showing of an adverse impact, the plaintiffs failed to pre-
sent a prima facie case of national origin discrimination, and the em-
ployer was not required to show a business necessity for the policy.47
Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision not to follow the EEOC guidelines, 
employers would seemingly never be required to show a business justi-
fication for an English-only policy in a disparate impact case brought 
by bilingual employees, as these individuals could always choose to 
avoid the policy’s consequences by speaking in English. 
to use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion which may lead other employees to suffer 
humiliation.” (alteration in original)). 
40 See id. at 1483-84 (noting that the suit was filed as a class action on behalf of all 
Spanish-speaking employees at the plant). 
41 See id. at 1489 (arguing that questions of a hostile work environment are inher-
ently fact specific and are not conducive to a per se rule). 
42 Id. at 1490. 
43 See id. at 1489 (claiming that the existence of an English-only policy “does not 
inexorably lead to an abusive environment”). 
44 See id. (“[W]e reach a conclusion opposite to the EEOC’s long standing posi-
tion. . . . We do not reject the English-only rule Guideline lightly. . . . But we are not 
bound by the Guidelines.”). 
45 See id. at 1490 (emphasizing Congress’s desire to balance the need to eliminate 
discrimination against its attempt to respect the independence of the employer). 
46 Id. at 1489. 
47 Id. at 1490. 
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C.  Maldonado v. City of Altus 
Most recently, in 2006, the Tenth Circuit addressed language re-
strictions and national origin discrimination in Maldonado v. City of Al-
tus.48  In this case, the city of Altus implemented an English-only policy 
for all of its employees for “all work related and business communica-
tions during the work day.”49  Among the plaintiffs’ allegations was the 
contention that this policy created a hostile work environment for 
Hispanic employees.50
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants on both the disparate impact and the 
disparate treatment claims.51  While the court did not definitively rule 
on the legal question of the amount of deference due to the EEOC 
guidelines (since in order to reverse the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment it was only required to determine that a rational juror 
could have found for the plaintiffs),52 the court did note that the 
EEOC guidelines were persuasive.53  The court also rested its decision 
largely upon these guidelines.54  Although it still was not willing to en-
dorse wholeheartedly the EEOC guidelines, the Tenth Circuit clearly 
believed that an English-only policy could constitute national origin 
discrimination and that the EEOC guidelines provided at least persua-
sive evidence for the court to consider. 
D.  District Court Decisions Since Spun Steak
Since the decision in Garcia v. Spun Steak, eleven district court de-
cisions have addressed whether English-only language policies consti-
tute national origin discrimination against bilingual employees.  
48 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
49 Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1299 (emphasis omitted). 
50 See id. at 1301 (detailing the reasons that the employees considered the policy to 
create a hostile work environment and reviewing plaintiffs’ affidavits about their ex-
periences under the policy). 
51 Id. at 1316. 
52 Id. at 1305. 
53 See id. at 1306 (“We believe that [the EEOC’s] conclusions are entitled to re-
spect, not as interpretations of the governing law, but as an indication of what a rea-
sonable, informed person may think about the impact of an English-only work rule on 
minority employees, even if we might not draw the same inference.”). 
54 See id. at 1306-08 (concluding that a reasonable juror could find both that the 
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant’s 
business justification was inadequate). 
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These cases can be grouped into three broad categories.  The first 
group of cases finds that an English-only policy did not have an ad-
verse impact on bilingual employees, but it does not address the rele-
vance of, or level of deference due, the EEOC guidelines.  The second 
category consists of those cases that recognize that an English-only 
policy can have an adverse impact on bilingual speakers, but that re-
fuse to give deference to the EEOC guidelines in establishing that ad-
verse impact.  Finally, there is a series of cases that explicitly relies on 
the EEOC guidelines as establishing that English-only policies have an 
adverse impact, even on bilingual employees.  A brief overview of 
these cases will help flesh out how courts are grappling with the guide-
lines and the effect that these guidelines have on case outcomes. 
Only two cases have completely rejected the possibility that an 
English-only policy could have an adverse impact on bilingual em-
ployees.  Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc.55 was the first case decided by a 
district court following Spun Steak, and it relied heavily on Gloor.  The 
court claimed that English-only rules as applied to bilingual employ-
ees did not violate Title VII since the rules had no adverse impact on 
those employees.56  The court, however, did not address the level of 
deference due the EEOC guidelines.  Instead, it found that the em-
ployer had successfully shown a business necessity for the practice and 
that it therefore would have prevailed even if the EEOC guidelines 
had applied and automatically shifted the burden.57
More recently, in Navarette v. Nike Inc., the District of Oregon also 
failed to reach the question of deference due the EEOC guidelines 
since it found that “the Ninth Circuit has held English-only policies 
similar to that used by Defendant were not discriminatory and did not 
violate Title VII with regard to bilingual employees.”58  Therefore, in 
both of the district court decisions that categorically deny any adverse 
impact of an English-only policy on bilingual employees, the courts relied 
on circuit court precedent and did not analyze the issue independently.
Unconstrained by a prior circuit court ruling, several other district 
courts considered anew whether English-only policies could constitute 
national origin discrimination against bilingual employees but refused 
to give deference to the EEOC guidelines.  The first such case was 
55 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
56 Id. at 1354. 
57 Id.
58 No. 05-1827, 2007 WL 2890976, at *7 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2007) (citing Garcia v. 
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
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Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia.59  There, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania did not go so far as to say that English-only rules applied 
to bilingual employees cannot be discriminatory under Title VII, but it 
held that the church’s English-only policy, as applied to the plaintiff, 
was not national origin discrimination.60  Further, the court noted that 
the EEOC guidelines should be entirely disregarded as being beyond 
the scope of the Commission’s authority since the guidelines altered 
the burden-shifting formula found in the Civil Rights Act.61  While not 
making such an extreme statement, this was also the position taken by 
a District of Massachusetts judge in Cosme v. Salvation Army.62  That 
court emphasized that it was not bound by the EEOC guidelines,63 but 
it still gave them some consideration, finding that the guidelines were 
not overly prejudicial to employers.64  After some analysis, however, 
the court found that the English-only policy at issue in that case was 
not discriminatory.65  While these two cases and the others in this cate-
gory66 do not definitively close the door on the possibility of bilingual 
employees successfully bringing suit for national origin discrimination 
if they are subject to an English-only policy, it can be extremely diffi-
cult for them to demonstrate an adverse impact since these courts re-
fuse to defer to the EEOC guidelines. 
The third group of district courts has relied explicitly upon the 
EEOC guidelines in adjudicating national origin discrimination 
claims, finding that English-only policies have an adverse impact on 
bilingual employees.  The Northern District of Illinois was the first to 
do so in EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc.67  This court declared that 
59 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
60 Id. at 736. 
61 Id. at 735. 
62 284 F. Supp. 2d. 229 (D. Mass. 2003). 
63 See id. at 240 (stating that the EEOC guidelines offer guidance but are not binding). 
64 See id. (noting that the presence of an English-only policy does not always result 
in a successful claim for the plaintiff). 
65 Id.
66 The lines of analysis presented in Kania and Cosme are representative of the 
cases found in this category.  See Velasquez v. Goldwater Mem’l Hosp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 
257, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (following a similar line of analysis as Kania and finding that 
if the EEOC guidelines were read to provide a “presumption of discrimination,” they 
would conflict with the plain meaning of the statute and would therefore be invalid); 
Tran v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210-11 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(holding, prior to Maldonado, that the EEOC guidelines could provide guidance, but 
implicitly ignoring them by not finding an adverse impact despite the presence of an 
English-only policy—much as the court did in Cosme).
67 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
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it “find[s] it possible to impose liability . . . perhaps even as to those 
bilingual employees who can ‘readily comply with the English-only 
rule and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job.’”68  Further, 
the court stated that it was obliged to give “substantial weight” to the 
EEOC’s findings that English-only policies by themselves are enough 
to establish a substantial adverse impact.69  Shortly afterwards, the 
Northern District of Texas decided EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, 
Inc.70  That court found that English-only policies constituted national 
origin discrimination since they had a disparate impact on Spanish-
speaking employees, preventing them from speaking in the language 
with which they were most comfortable and placing bilingual employ-
ees at a disproportionate risk of punishment.71  In addition, this court 
went even further than the Illinois court in claiming that the EEOC 
guidelines deserved “great deference.”72  Decisions such as these af-
firmatively accept and apply the EEOC guidelines to bilingual em-
ployees claiming national origin discrimination.73
Other courts in the third category have been willing to use the 
guidelines but have been less enthusiastic in their support of them.  
For example, the Eastern District of New York, in Gonzalo v. All Island 
Transportation,74  “assume[d] without deciding”—since the employer’s 
adequate business justification prevented the burden shifting from be-
ing dispositive—that the EEOC guidelines would apply.75  While cases 
like Gonzalo do fall within the third category—as they both read Title 
VII to allow for national origin discrimination claims based on Eng-
lish-only policies and grant at least some deference to the EEOC 
guidelines—they are extremely different from those that actively ad-
vocate deference to the national origin guidelines. 
Given the range of results and paths of analysis followed by the 
district courts in the wake of Spun Steak and Maldonado, clarity is nec-
68 Id. at 913 (quoting Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
69 Id.
70 75 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 1999). 
71 Id. at 558. 
72 Id. at 556. 
73 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (applying the EEOC guidelines to establish the English-only policy’s adverse im-
pact and the prima facie case of national origin discrimination, but finding that facili-
tating “communications with customers” was a sufficient business justification to al-
low the policy). 
74 No. 04-3452, 2007 WL 642959 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007). 
75 Id. at *2.  The court in Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Systems, 409 F. Supp. 2d 
1313, 1337-38 (D.N.M. 2005), also took this approach. 
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essary.  Such clarity, however, need not wait for a ruling from the Su-
preme Court.  The field of administrative law has already addressed 
many of the questions raised by the interpretation of the EEOC guide-
lines, and it is to this that we now turn. 
II. EXPLORING THE FRAMEWORK OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In determining whether or not to grant deference to the EEOC 
guidelines, courts are not writing on a blank slate.  Rather, they are 
addressing these guidelines in the context of administrative law.  In 
order to understand the courts’ decisions, it is thus necessary to pro-
vide a brief overview of how these guidelines fit into the framework of 
administrative law.76
A.  The Powerful Impact of Rules 
Courts have generally granted wide berth for agencies to issue 
rules.  In SEC v. Chenery Corp., the Supreme Court established that an 
agency is entitled to decide whether it will proceed with ad hoc adju-
dications or truncate the process by issuing a rule.77  The court upheld 
and revisited this decision, in a slightly different context, in Heckler v. 
Campbell.78  There, the Supreme Court reiterated that rulemaking was 
an acceptable practice—even for agencies with primarily adjudicatory 
authority—and emphasized that there did not need to be an individ-
76 Some scholars have questioned whether courts treat rules and regulations issu-
ing from the EEOC as altogether different from those promulgated by other agencies.  
See generally Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:  The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court grants less deference 
to EEOC determinations than it does to other agencies because of a lack of faith that 
the EEOC is composed of experts on the subject and because of suspicions about the 
agency’s agenda).  This Comment does not attempt such an objective explanation of 
federal jurisprudence on the subject, but rather makes a normative legal argument as 
to why the courts should not treat EEOC guidelines—and more specifically its guide-
lines on English-only language policies—differently from how it treats regulations from 
other agencies or even other guidelines issued by the EEOC itself. 
77 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made be-
tween proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies pri-
marily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); see also Air Line Pi-
lots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1960) (upholding the FAA’s 
authority to issue a rule, even if it results in the deprivation of property without an in-
dividual adjudication, and noting that it is not required that every individual affected 
by the rule have a voice in its adoption). 
78 461 U.S. 458 (1983). 
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ual determination in each case that came before an agency.79  There-
fore, in choosing to adopt and apply its guidelines rather than deter-
mine the impact of English-only rules on a case-by-case basis, the 
EEOC was on solid legal ground. 
The decision to issue a rule, however, can have a powerful im-
pact—one that can be seen very clearly in the case of the EEOC guide-
lines.  When these guidelines are followed, courts apply the agency’s 
rule—rather than the statute—directly to the conduct to determine 
whether there is an adverse impact.80  In the context of national origin 
discrimination, if the EEOC’s guidelines are followed, the employee 
need only show that there is an English-only policy; she need not show 
that the English-only policy constitutes a substantial adverse impact.  
Demonstrating the presence of an English-only policy would truncate 
the analysis by automatically establishing a substantial adverse impact, 
and it would shift the burden to the employer to establish a legitimate 
business necessity for the practice. 
The variation between the Ninth Circuit’s and the Tenth Circuit’s 
analyses shows the difference in outcome that this seemingly minor 
change can have, especially for bilingual employees.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit declined to find any substantial adverse impact resulting from the 
English-only policy, noting that the employees could comply with the 
policy because they were bilingual.81  The Tenth Circuit, on the other 
hand, relied on the expertise of the EEOC to establish that every Eng-
lish-only policy has a substantial adverse impact.  By doing so, it by-
passed the question of whether an employee’s ability to comply with 
an English-only rule prevented that rule from having an adverse im-
pact.82  The burden was then shifted to the employer, immediately 
placing the plaintiff in a better position.  The decision, therefore, of 
whether or not to treat the EEOC guidelines as a rule that the courts 
will follow has a significant impact on the trajectory of the case.  This 
fact was recognized by the court in Kania, which declared that 
79 See id. at 467 (claiming that although the statutory scheme anticipated individu-
alized adjudications, there was no reason to relitigate classes of claims that did not re-
quire case-by-case attention, and thereby allowing the agency to supplement its adju-
dicatory power with rulemaking authority). 
80 See, e.g., EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913-14 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) (noting that the EEOC guidelines create an inference that English-only policies 
have an adverse impact and that this inference by itself would be sufficient to carry a dis-
crimination claim if the employer did not advance a business justification for the policy). 
81 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993). 
82 Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2006), abrogated on 
other grounds by Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
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“[w]ithout the leverage provided by the EEOC Guidelines, Kania’s 
claim that the English-only rule amounted to national origin discrimi-
nation, as applied to her, quickly collapses.”83
B.  The Level of Deference Due to Agency Rules 
Not all rules deserve the same amount of deference under admin-
istrative law principles.  The Supreme Court has recognized that cer-
tain standards of thoughtfulness and consistency can lead to increased 
deference.84  In addition, the legislative history of an act can lend sub-
stantial support to an agency’s interpretation of the statute.85  Finally, 
courts have consistently granted deference to informal guidelines is-
sued by other agencies even when they were issued following less for-
mal processes than those used by the EEOC.86
1.  Deference Required by Supreme Court Precedent 
Depending on their characteristics, individual rules issued by 
agencies receive different levels of deference from the courts.87  Un-
der EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,88 when determining the degree 
of deference to give to an agency’s rule, the court should examine the 
thoroughness of consideration that the agency gave to the topic be-
fore issuing the rule, the validity of the agency’s rationale behind the 
83 Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
84 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). 
85 See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1979) (using legislative 
history and consistent administrative interpretation of the statute in question to sup-
port the agency’s deteriminations). 
86 See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (granting deference to Bureau of 
Prisons’s regulations). 
87 As described by one court, 
[D]eference is a legal concept that allocates roles between one adjudicating 
tribunal and another.  For example, because an agency or a trial court may be 
better suited to make factual findings, a reviewing tribunal may sustain those 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial 
evidence, or the like. . . . Notions of deference are governed by standards of 
review and should not be confused with presumptions and other like proce-
dural devices. 
Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  Chevron def-
erence, which requires that a court uphold an agency’s interpretation of its organic 
statute so long as the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is a “permis-
sible construction of the statute,” is the highest form of deference for agency determina-
tions.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
88 499 U.S. 244. 
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rule, and the rule’s consistency with prior agency adjudications as well 
as the uniform application of the rule following its implementation.89
The EEOC guidelines on national origin discrimination deserve 
deference since they satisfy all three factors of the Arabian American Oil
test.  On the first prong, although the guidelines are not official legis-
lative rules, there was an extensive public-comment process.  The 
EEOC solicited public comment before issuing its rule and received 
approximately 250 comments.90  This process was certainly sufficient 
to ensure that the guidelines were not issued in a capricious manner 
but instead were the product of a careful and deliberative process that 
culminated in the issuance of guidelines.  In addition, the middle 
prong—the rationale behind the Commission’s guidelines—is also sat-
isfied, as will be discussed in Section III.A.  Finally, the guidelines eas-
ily meet the third prong of the Arabian American Oil test:  the policy 
for dealing with English-only rules has been consistently applied since 
1970, even before the interpretation was codified in sections 1606.1 
and 1606.7.91  These guidelines were issued promptly after the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Gloor, which attempted to remove language char-
acteristics from national origin discrimination, and neither section has 
been amended or been subject to a revised interpretation since their 
issuance.92  The guidelines represent the expert opinion of the agency 
for over thirty-five years, and the EEOC has continued to hold this in-
terpretation as it observes the guidelines working in practice.  The 
EEOC’s guidelines on national origin discrimination meet all three 
criteria set forth in Arabian American Oil, confirming that they deserve 
deference from the courts. 
Additional Supreme Court precedent offers further support for 
granting deference to the EEOC guidelines.  In United States v. Ruther-
ford, the Court made clear that if Congress is aware of the agency’s in-
terpretation of a statute and subsequently amends the statute without 
amending the specific portion at issue, the Court will interpret that 
action as tacit congressional approval of the agency’s reading.93  In 
89 See id. at 257 (setting forth the three-prong approach and citing General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)). 
90 Patterson, supra note 30, at 287. 
91 Id. at 287-88 & n.72. 
92 Cf. Natalie Prescott, Employers on the Fence:  A Guide to the Immigratory Workplace, 29 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 193-94 (2007) (decrying the fact that the EEOC continues to 
consider language characteristics a part of national origin). 
93 See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-54 (1979) (asserting that the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is meant to have jurisdiction over drugs for the 
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that case, the Court determined that the FDA’s determination that it 
was authorized to regulate drugs for terminally ill patients under the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act deserved “substantial deference.”94
This deference was further reinforced by the congressional history, 
which showed a clear congressional intent to leave the agency’s inter-
pretation in place.95  The Court supported this deference largely with 
appeals to separation-of-powers concerns and with respect for both 
the executive and legislative branches.96
These considerations add credence to the belief that Congress in-
tended courts to apply Title VII consistently with the EEOC’s guide-
lines.  When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it was conscious of 
the EEOC guidelines, but it did not touch the portions dealing with 
national origin discrimination.97  Furthermore, Congress did not sim-
ply tacitly approve the interpretation, but specifically addressed the 
guidelines in discussing the amendments.  Two exchanges between 
Senators Dennis DeConcini and Edward Kennedy illustrate this point.  
In the first, the Senators agreed that national origin discrimination 
included “discrimination based upon characteristics common to a spe-
cific ethnic group, such as ancestry, culture, linguistic characteristics—
including language and speech accent—physical characteristics, and 
birthplace.”98  In their second exchange, they agreed that the EEOC 
guidelines provided a “sound and effective method” for dealing with 
the problem of English-only language policies and that the amend-
ments would not “in any way adversely affect the EEOC regulation on 
language use in the workplace.”99  With such a record, it is difficult to 
argue that Congress did not intend Title VII to be consistent with the 
terminally ill since Committee Reports for the 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act “note with approval” that it is current FDA policy to do so and the 
Amendments did not seek to change this practice); cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983) (finding that where Congress is aware of an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute, a failure to amend that portion of the statute pro-
vides support for the agency’s interpretation). 
94 Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 553 (citing Bd. of Governors of FRS v. First Lincolnwood 
Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248 (1978), and Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304 
(1977)).
95 See id. at 554 (“Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an 
agency’s interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Con-
gress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.”). 
96 See id. (noting the Court’s hesitation to go against both clear congressional in-
tent and the interpretation of the administrative agency). 
97 See supra Section I.B (discussing the 1991 amendments). 
98 137 CONG. REC. 29,051 (1991) (emphasis added). 
99 Id.
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EEOC guidelines.  This shows that, at least following the 1991 amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC guidelines were clearly in line 
with congressional intent.  Because of this difficulty, and because the 
guidelines were thoughtfully developed and consistently applied, 
Rutherford and other Supreme Court precedent require that courts 
give the EEOC guidelines at least some deference. 
2.  Deference Required by Analogy 
The EEOC guidelines at issue are not standard legislative rules is-
sued by agencies; rather, they are more analogous to interpretative 
rules that explain how an agency intends to apply its organic statute.100
Courts, however, have given similar deference to regulations issued by 
other agencies even when the regulations are less formal than those 
issued by the EEOC.  In both Reno v. Koray and Grassi v. Hood, for ex-
ample, the courts determined that the Bureau of Prisons’s program 
statements deserved “some deference.”101  In Grassi, in particular, the 
program statement was very analogous to the EEOC guidelines at is-
sue here.  There, the Bureau had listed offenses that were not consid-
ered “nonviolent” when evaluating a prisoner for early release.102
Such a ruling truncates the adjudicative process in a manner similar to 
the EEOC guidelines:  by defining a potentially vague statutory term, 
such as “nonviolent” or “significant adverse impact,” the focus is 
shifted to the factual existence of a conviction or an English-only pol-
icy, rather than to whether or not the conduct at issue falls within the 
statutory term.  Furthermore, the Bureau of Prisons’s regulations are 
less formal than the EEOC guidelines, as the Bureau did not under-
take the notice-and-comment process that preceded the adoption of 
section 1606.103
Given that courts have granted “some deference” to the Bureau of 
Prisons’s less formal interpretative rules, it is difficult to find justifica-
tion for granting no deference to the EEOC’s guidelines.  This stance 
was recognized by the First Circuit in Arnold v. UPS, Inc., in which the 
court claimed that EEOC guidelines in general “constitute a body of 
100 Black’s Law Dictionary defines an interpretative rule as “[a]n administrative rule 
explaining an agency’s interpretation of a statute.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
101 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995); Grassi v. Hood, 251 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th 
Cir. 2001), amended on reh’g en banc, 260 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2001). 
102 Grassi, 251 F.3d at 1220. 
103 E.g., Reno, 515 U.S. at 61. 
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experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”104  The court concluded that the guide-
lines on disability discrimination “deserve at least as much considera-
tion as a mere ‘internal agency guideline,’ which the Supreme Court 
has held is entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as it is a permissible 
construction of the statute.”105
From both the case law and the treatment of similar guidelines is-
sued by other agencies, a strong argument exists for at least granting 
some deference to the EEOC guidelines on national origin discrimi-
nation.  The guidelines were tacitly approved by Congress when it 
amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991, were issued following a rela-
tively formal process, are supported by a valid rationale, and have en-
joyed consistent application since their inception.  Finally, the courts 
have repeatedly granted deference to interpretative rules, including 
analogous provisions promulgated by the Bureau of Prisons, even 
though they are significantly less formal than the EEOC guidelines. 
III. THE WISDOM OF THE EEOC GUIDELINES:
POLICY AND PRACTICE
In examining the rationale behind the EEOC’s approach, it is 
necessary to look at both the policy reasons for following the guide-
lines and the practical effects that the approach has had.  Further, it is 
helpful to compare the treatment of national-origin-discrimination 
claims to those based on race and sex, as these are the most frequently 
litigated portions of Title VII and the courts have had a full opportu-
nity to consider the EEOC guidelines on those subjects.106  After exam-
ining each of these issues, it is clear that the guidelines are well sup-
ported and should be followed. 
104 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
105 Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864 (citing Reno, 515 U.S. at 61).  But see Sicard v. City of 
Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1434 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (claiming that “courts have the 
discretion to substitute their own judgment” for that of the agency when examining in-
terpretative rules). 
106 See supra note 8 (noting that race and sex discrimination claims each were al-
leged in approximately thirty percent of charges brought under Title VII between 1997 
and 2007). 
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A.  Following the EEOC Guidelines Is Both Practical and Good Policy 
Beyond the precedential reasons for granting deference to the 
EEOC guidelines, there are strong policy reasons for doing so.  First, 
most cases that raise national-origin-discrimination claims in response 
to an English-only policy are likely to be disparate impact cases, since 
the policy will apply to all employees but will only have an adverse ef-
fect on some.  In this type of case, the employee is not required to 
show that the policy was motivated by discriminatory intent.107  Be-
cause of this lower burden, the conduct at issue could be suitably 
regulated by a blanket rule:  it is the policy itself, and not its imple-
mentation (unless the claim becomes one of disparate treatment), 
that is discriminatory, and policies that have a disparate impact in one 
setting are likely to have the same effect as those in another setting.  
Further, if the disparate impact that results is the creation of a hostile 
work environment, as is often the case with English-only policies, 
there is frequently little concrete proof as to how the policy affects 
working conditions.108  In situations such as these, it might be more 
appropriate to deal with the issue through a general rule rather than 
with a case-by-case analysis that hinges on how well the employee tells 
a tragic story, how visible the employee’s distress is from the policy, or 
how sympathetic the jury is to this particular plaintiff.  Issuing a uni-
form guideline to address English-only policies is a sensible solution 
that will allow for both clarity and uniformity in application. 
Not only is the topic of English-only policies generally well suited 
to an interpretative rule, but the specific rule itself is also supported 
by a valid rationale.  The EEOC strongly believes that English-only 
language policies always have a substantial adverse impact on those 
who speak other languages.  Reasons supporting this belief include 
the following:  English-only policies may “create an atmosphere of in-
107 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
108 In his dissent in Spun Steak, Judge Boochever noted that 
proof of [an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation caused by] 
English-only rules requires analysis of subjective factors.  It is hard to envision 
how the burden of proving such an effect would be met other than by conclu-
sory self-serving statements of the Spanish-speaking employees or possibly by 
expert testimony of psychologists.  The difficulty of meeting such a burden 
may well have been one of the reasons for the promulgation of the [EEOC] 
guideline.  On the other hand, it should not be difficult for an employer to 
give specific reasons for the policy . . . . 
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 988 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (Boochever, J., dissenting). 
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feriority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin”;109 these 
policies inherently treat bilingual speakers differently by preventing 
them from speaking in the language of their choice; these rules can 
create barriers to employment for those with limited English-language 
skills; these rules can prevent employees from speaking in the lan-
guage in which they can most effectively communicate;110 and there is 
a disproportionate risk of punishment for bilingual speakers.111  The 
policies, in other words, not only create a hostile work environment 
but also have potential side effects that fall solely on those who speak 
languages other than English, subjecting them to different terms and 
conditions of employment than those employees who speak only Eng-
lish.  All the reasons offered by the EEOC could be used by individual 
plaintiffs to establish that they have suffered a substantial adverse im-
pact, but when brought before different judges they might meet with 
varying levels of success.  As a body with special expertise on the sub-
ject, the EEOC issued its national origin guidelines to ensure that 
these adverse impacts were recognized and adequately addressed by 
the courts in every case. 
Further, following the EEOC guidelines does not require aban-
doning the standard disparate impact analysis; indeed, the two cannot 
be separated, as some scholars have argued.112  The key point is that, 
for the reasons enumerated above, and following a period of public 
comment and deliberation, the EEOC determined that English-only 
language policies always have a substantial adverse impact on employ-
ees who speak languages other than English.113  This, however, is not 
the end of the analysis.  As with any other practice that has an alleged 
disparate impact, if the employer can show a legitimate business ob-
jective (such as safety, as advocated in Spun Steak,114 or to facilitate su-
109 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008). 
110 See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006), abro-
gated on other grounds by Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
111 Cf. Amy Crowe, Comment, May I Speak?  Issues Raised by Employer’s English-Only 
Policies, 30 J. CORP. L. 593, 602 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of code-switching, 
which suggests that bilingual individuals may not be able to fully control in what lan-
guage they speak at all times). 
112 See Melissa Meitus, Comment, English-Only Policies in the Workplace:  Disparate Im-
pact Compared to the EEOC Guidelines, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 901, 913-14 (2007) (seeking to 
isolate the EEOC guidelines as employing a separate form of analysis from the dispa-
rate impact analysis). 
113 See supra Section I.A. 
114 See 998 F.2d at 1483 (noting that non–Spanish speaking employees were dis-
tracted by the use of Spanish while using machinery, and also claiming that the policy 
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pervisor oversight, as advocated in Gloor115), the policy may still stand.  
In this way, the guidelines fit within and help define—rather than re-
place—the burden-shifting format established by Title VII. 
The EEOC guidelines on national origin are not just good policy; 
they also work well in practice.  The district courts, as discussed in Sec-
tion I.D, have issued several rulings that have used the EEOC guide-
lines in various ways.  Looking at these cases, a few points stand out.  
The first is that, in general, the district courts have either granted 
some deference to the EEOC guidelines or have at least used the 
guidelines to help inform their analyses.  This point is seen most 
clearly in EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc.116 and EEOC v. Premier Op-
erator Services, Inc.,117 where the courts specifically stated that the guide-
lines were due a substantial amount of deference.  Even those courts, 
however, that did not feel bound by the EEOC guidelines (or that did 
not reach a decision as to whether or not they were bound to show 
any deference to them), still frequently applied the guidelines to aid 
their analyses.118  Only the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kania119
and the two district courts constrained by precedent refused to ac-
knowledge the guidelines as having possible persuasive value.120  The 
second point is that the presumption in favor of applying the guide-
lines is not outcome determinative.  In only two of the five cases in 
which they were considered did the courts rule in favor of the em-
ployees.121  In the other three cases that applied the guidelines, courts 
have found a legitimate business justification for the policies, and 
therefore have not found them to be discriminatory; even though the 
guidelines applied, the outcome remained the same.122  Ultimately, it 
seems that there has been an increase in the number of courts that 
would promote workplace harmony and increase the ability to communicate with fac-
tory inspectors). 
115 See 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (arguing that non–Spanish speaking su-
pervisors would not be able to perform their duties effectively if subordinates were able 
to speak Spanish and that customers objected to communications that they could not 
understand).
116 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
117 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999). 
118 See, e.g., Cosme v. Salvation Army, 284 F. Supp. 2d. 229, 240 (D. Mass. 2003). 
119 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
120 Navarette v. Nike Inc., No. 05-1827, 2007 WL 2890976 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2007); 
Prado v. L. Luria & Son, 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
121 Premier Operator Servs., 75 F. Supp. 2d at 550; Synchro-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 911. 
122 Gonzalo v. All Island Transp., No. 04-3452, 2007 WL 642959 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 
2007); Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 2005); 
EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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are willing to consider the EEOC guidelines and that find them to be 
at least persuasive if not binding, but this change has not resulted in a 
complete tipping of the scales against the employers.  Rather, it has 
merely shifted the focus to the business justification proffered by the 
employer. 
The rationale behind the EEOC guidelines is valid, lending 
stronger support to the argument that they should be granted defer-
ence.  English-only policies are appropriately suited to regulation by a 
rule, and the EEOC’s specific guidelines are well supported.  In addi-
tion, adopting the guidelines would not require a change in the dis-
crimination analysis, but rather would fit within the existing burden-
shifting formula.  Finally, the guidelines work well in practice and are 
not prejudicial to employers.  All of this supports granting deference 
to the guidelines. 
B.  A Comparison to Race and Sex Discrimination Claims 
It is worth comparing the courts’ treatment of national origin dis-
crimination to their jurisprudence in the realms of race and sex dis-
crimination.  In both of these areas, courts have been much more will-
ing to entertain broad statutory readings and to follow the guidelines 
issued by the EEOC.  Since Title VII lists without differentiation the 
bases on which it is impermissible for employers to discriminate, the 
courts should interpret each of the provisions similarly and grant the 
same breadth to national origin discrimination as they do to race and 
sex discrimination. 
In the area of sex discrimination, broad readings of the statute are 
especially prevalent.  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court 
found that the ban on discrimination on the basis of sex included a 
prohibition on sex stereotyping as well.123  In that case, a woman was 
denied a promotion not solely because she was a woman, but because 
she was a woman who displayed stereotypically male behavior.124  This 
reading was endorsed by Congress in the 1991 amendments when it 
extended the holding of Price Waterhouse to allow recovery even in 
cases where an employer was only partially motivated by an improper 
consideration of sex and likely would have chosen not to promote or 
123 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989). 
124 See id. at 250 (asserting that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”). 
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hire the individual even without the invidious discrimination.125  The 
relationship between sex discrimination and sex stereotyping claims is 
very similar to that between English-only employment policies and na-
tional origin discrimination; although not explicitly listed in the stat-
ute, English-only policies reasonably fall under national origin dis-
crimination and received an implied endorsement from Congress 
when the Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991.126
The Supreme Court has also held—although there is no mention 
of it in Title VII—that sexual harassment falls under sex discrimina-
tion,127 and it more recently has concluded that even though it “was 
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted Title VII,” same-sex sexual harassment may also fall under the 
statute.128  Of special interest is the use of the EEOC guidelines in de-
termining the breadth of coverage of sex discrimination.  Noting the 
relative dearth of legislative history, the court in Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson turned to an extensive discussion of the EEOC guide-
lines, finding that they fully support the inclusion of sexual harass-
ment as a type of sex discrimination and have done so consistently.129
Again, if a similar method of interpretation was applied to a national-
origin-discrimination claim, there should be no reason to believe that 
national origin discrimination could not encompass “language dis-
crimination” claims.  While these claims also assuredly are not the 
“principal evil” with which Congress was concerned, this does not 
mean that Title VII cannot protect them.  In fact, the EEOC has con-
sistently held that it does. 
Although Title VII does not specifically address discrimination 
that focuses on language, the EEOC’s decision to place such conduct 
under the umbrella of national origin discrimination is not without 
merit.  The Supreme Court’s willingness to read Title VII’s prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination broadly and to examine closely the EEOC 
guidelines for support should send a message to lower courts to do 
the same for national origin discrimination, especially in the face of 
legislative history that supports such a reading.130
125 See, e.g., Greenwood v. Stone, 136 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1992) 
(“Section 107 reverses the liability limitations imposed on mixed motive cases by the 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . . . .”). 
126 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
127 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986). 
128 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-81 (1998). 
129 477 U.S. at 65-67. 
130 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
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In addition, the courts have been much more willing to grant def-
erence to the EEOC guidelines in the realms of race and sex discrimi-
nation.  The Eleventh Circuit, in particular, stated that the EEOC’s 
position that employers are liable for the conduct of their supervisory 
agents was entitled to “great deference” and should be adopted.131
Many district courts also have explicitly imported requirements estab-
lished by the EEOC guidelines.  This is most clearly apparent in situa-
tions where the employer relies on an entry test to determine em-
ployment eligibility, such as those frequently required by police and 
fire departments.  In these cases, many courts require that the em-
ployer conform to the EEOC guidelines to meet its burden of proving 
that the test is not racially discriminatory.132  Most striking, however, is 
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement 
responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to permit only 
the use of job-related tests.  The administrative interpretation of the Act by 
the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. . . .  Since the Act and 
its legislative history support the Commission’s construction, this affords 
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.
133
If this interpretation is true in the case of the EEOC’s guidelines as 
they relate to evaluating tests that have an alleged disparate impact on 
racial minorities, there is no reason that it should not also be true for 
determining the breadth of national origin discrimination.  Given 
both the validity of the EEOC’s interpretation and the legislative his-
tory discussed above, it is clear that, under Griggs, the EEOC’s guide-
lines on national origin discrimination should be given deference. 
The Supreme Court itself has broadly interpreted sex discrimina-
tion in several of its precedents, and courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have repeatedly granted deference to the EEOC’s guidelines in 
evaluating race and sex discrimination claims.  No persuasive reason 
exists for not also extending this treatment to national origin dis-
crimination under Title VII. 
131 Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 n.8 (11th Cir. 1987). 
132 See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 515 (D. 
Mass. 1974); Vulcan Soc’y of the N.Y. City Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 360 F. 
Supp. 1265, 1273 & n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); W. Addition Cmty. Org. v. Alioto, 340 F. 
Supp. 1351, 1354 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citing numerous cases that have applied the 
guidelines as such). 
133 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (citations omitted). 
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CONCLUSION
As a policy with solid theoretical and practical applications, the 
courts should grant deference to the EEOC guidelines on English-
only language rules in the workplace.  While Gloor began the depar-
ture from the EEOC’s interpretation in 1980 and Spun Steak also de-
clined to follow the EEOC guidelines in finding that an English-only 
language policy did not constitute an adverse impact, the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Maldonado gives reason to question if the tide might 
be reversing.  This change would bring the EEOC’s guidelines on 
English-only policies in line with administrative law by requiring some 
deference for the interpretative rules that the Commission has im-
plemented.  Such a move would not only comport with administrative 
law, but it would be supported by Supreme Court precedent, congres-
sional history, and the courts’ treatment of similar interpretative rules.  
Additionally, the EEOC guidelines are good policy, and their use has 
not resulted in any overt favoritism of plaintiffs at the expense of their 
employers.  Finally, when comparing the breadth of interpretation 
and the deference granted to the EEOC guidelines in the areas of sex- 
and race-discrimination claims, it becomes clear that there is no basis 
for not doing the same for national origin discrimination. 
With the presence of a circuit split and large variance among dis-
trict courts’ treatment of the issue, it is time for the Supreme Court to 
address whether “language discrimination” can fall under national 
origin discrimination and what role the EEOC guidelines should play 
in this analysis.  When examining national origin discrimination, how-
ever, it is imperative that the Court remember the purposes of Title 
VII—“to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group . . . over other employees.”134  The number of bilingual employ-
ees in the workforce is likely to continue to increase rapidly.  In addi-
tion, the issue of national origin discrimination is likely to become a 
hot-button topic in the law in the coming years.  With this back-
ground, and the strong reliance that bilingual employees especially 
place on these guidelines, it is imperative that the courts continue to 
recognize the expertise of agencies and allow the EEOC to regulate 
national origin discrimination. 
134 Id. at 429-30. 
